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1. Introduction  22 
The use of economic incentives, such as so-called payments for ecosystem services (PES), 23 
continues to gain increasing attention in environmental policy circles as an efficient and 24 
potentially equitable tool for environmental governance, including the conservation of 25 
biodiversity (Pascual et al., 2014). Here PES is defined broadly as a transfer of resources 26 
between actors, which aims to create incentives, subject to clear conditions, to align individual 27 
and/or collective resource use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural 28 
resources (modified from Muradian et al., 2010). The burgeoning research on PES schemes 29 
indicates that i) implementation of PES schemes is not a straightforward process as rational 30 
choice models might suggest (e.g Osborne, 2011; Rodríguez-de-Francisco and Budds, 2015; 31 
Rodríguez de Francisco et al., 2013; Vatn, 2010), ii) there is a high degree of complexity 32 
associated with the trade-offs between cost-effectiveness and other policy goals, such as social 33 
equity (e.g. Pascual et al., 2010; Pascual and Phelps, 2014), and iii) the introduction of PES 34 
impacts on power relations amongst stakeholders (e.g. Milne and Adams, 2012; 35 
Rodríguez-de-Francisco and Budds, 2015). 36 
We argue that the introduction of PES schemes is often associated with a layer of complexity 37 
because ecosystem service providers are not just suppliers of such services but are also 38 
‘institutional bricoleurs’ who rearrange the standardised PES-logics in order to ‘fit’ their own 39 
(local) social context. The term ‘bricoleurs’ implies that actors creatively combine elements 40 
from different institutional contexts into a new institutional arrangement (Christiansen, Larke 41 
and Lounsbury, 2013). This concept enables us to challenge the view of actors as powerless 42 
victims of institutional change. The application of the notion of institutional bricolage is helpful 43 
in undertaking power-sensitive analysis of environmental governance and can contribute to the 44 
inclusion of power relations into the ecosystem services framework (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 45 
2016; Pascual and Phelps, 2014; Van Hecken et al., 2015). We borrow the term ‘institutional 46 
bricolage’ from cultural anthropology (Douglas, 1986; Lévi-Strauss, 1966) and organisational 47 
studies (Christiansen, Larke and Lounsbury, 2013; Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Schneiberg, 48 
2002) and adapt it to conceptualise a process in which actors assemble or reshape existing (often 49 
local) institutions, such as collective action norms in the management of common pool 50 
resources (hereafter CPR), by combining them with a recently introduced PES scheme. We also 51 
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argue that due to institutional bricolage, the introduction of PES can often lead to a ‘messy’ 52 
institutional process with unintended consequences.1  53 
A case study from a rural community in Japan within Toyoka City is presented to illustrate the 54 
application of the idea of ‘institutional bricolage’ and show how it helps to analyse the ways in 55 
which a PES scheme may lead to messy institutional change. This PES scheme has been 56 
introduced as an incentive to support the conservation of a flagship endangered species, the 57 
Oriental White Stork (Ciconia boyciana), which is on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species 58 
and can only be found in Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. More generally, in Japan, PES 59 
approaches have been heralded as tackling the problem of under-use, rather than 60 
over-exploitation, of CPRs (see Section 3.1. for a description of problems caused by the 61 
under-use of CPRs). Since the 1990s, in Toyoka city, the local government has implemented 62 
eco-certification schemes for organic farming and eco-tourism to tackle this problem (Hyogo 63 
Prefectural Government, 2009). Toyoka city is considered to be one of the success stories in the 64 
use of a broadly defined PES scheme, along with Osaki City and Sado City, where similar 65 
schemes supporting flagship species have been implemented (Honda, 2008a; Wittmer and 66 
Gundimeda, 2010).2 67 
The case study from Toyoka city reveals how community residents act as institutional bricoleurs 68 
rearranging the PES-logic to ‘fit’ their own local context and to reproduce or change the power 69 
relations within their community. It illustrates that the implementation of a PES scheme is not 70 
just about incentivising people to align their resource use decisions with broader social interests 71 
but also about power struggles among stakeholders, such as between policy makers and local 72 
residents as well as among the residents themselves.  73 
                                                     
1  ‘Messy’ institutional process does not imply that deliberate institutional design is necessarily 
impossible. Each actor will act deliberately to achieve their own goal and use their resources to negotiate 
the institutional outcome. However, we term this process as ‘messy’ because it is not the deliberation of 
one actor or one social group, such as the implementer of a PES scheme, which determines the outcome; 
rather it is determined by the negotiations amongst various stakeholders. 
2 Both cities use flagship species similar to that of Toyoka. In Osaki city, the protected species is a goose 
and in Sado city, it is the crested ibis 
For details see; 
http://www.biodic.go.jp/biodiversity/shiraberu/policy/pes/satotisatoyama/satotisatoyama01.html for 
Osaki city and 
http://www.biodic.go.jp/biodiversity/shiraberu/policy/pes/satotisatoyama/satotisatoyama03.html for Sado 
city. 
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The next section introduces the central idea of institutional bricolage from a critical 74 
institutionalist perspective. Then, Section 3 describes the background and methodology used in 75 
the case study and Section 4 analyses how the PES scheme designed for the conservation of the 76 
Oriental White Stork in Toyoka city was contested, altered and articulated by the local 77 
community. The paper concludes with the main lessons learnt for future PES-based governance 78 
of biodiversity through the lens of institutional bricolage. 79 
 80 
2. Setting the scene: Institutional bricolage, agency, and power 81 
In recent years the institutionalist school of thought on the study of the commons, often termed 82 
critical institutionalism, has emerged to fill the gaps left by mainstream institutionalism led by 83 
the work of Elinor Ostrom (e.g. Cleaver, 2012; De Koning and Cleaver, 2012; Hall et al., 2014). 84 
The mainstream approach generally understands institutions as ‘the rules of the game’ which 85 
define what actors may (permitted), must (obliged) or may not (forbidden) do (Crawford and 86 
Ostrom, 1995; North, 1990). It argues that rational actors design appropriate institutions to fulfil 87 
certain functions, for instance to solve collective action problems or information asymmetries 88 
(Hotimsky et al., 2006). When carefully crafted, the assumption goes, CPR institutions can in 89 
principle curb individuals’ selfish incentives to free-ride and enhance collective action to avoid 90 
the over-exploitation of the commons (McKean, 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1989).  91 
Critical institutionalists emphasize that new institutions cannot be separated from the 92 
pre-existing social and cultural embeddedness of resource users and thus the messiness that 93 
arises from the multiplicity of their interests and the complexity through social interactions 94 
(Cleaver, 2002; Fabinyi et al., 2014; McCay, 2002; Mosse, 1997). For this school of thought, 95 
resource users do not hold narrowly defined utilitarian and purely instrumental preferences 96 
(Mosse, 1997). Instead they are viewed as holding multiple social identities and rationalities 97 
(Schnegg and Linke, 2015). This implies that CPR use cannot be understood solely in terms of a 98 
narrow desire to optimise a given objective (e.g. income maximization or risk minimization). It 99 
can also be strongly influenced by other concerns and interests stemming from various social 100 
identities and roles, as well as being associated with norms relating to authority/respect, 101 
in-group loyalty and fairness/reciprocity (Chan et al., 2016). It follows that institutional change 102 
relating to CPR use can be motivated, for example, by an elite’s desire to reproduce power 103 
relations (Hall et al., 2014; Hotimsky et al., 2006). It should also be pointed out that collective 104 
action for the conservation of CPR does not necessarily guarantee outcomes that are either 105 
socially or ecologically desirable (Ishihara and Pascual, 2009). 106 
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Critical institutionalism draws strongly on sociology and anthropology and institutions are 107 
understood as “social arrangements that shape and regulate human behaviour and have some 108 
degree of permanency and purpose transcending individual human lives and intentions” 109 
(Cleaver, 2012, p. 8). The process of institutional change is understood through the idea of 110 
‘institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver, 2002; Galvan, 2004), not as an issue of ‘crafting’ rules 111 
(Ostrom, 1992) or of searching for ‘institutional fit’ (Young, 2002) but by explicitly 112 
acknowledging the ‘messy’ process or the ‘unintended’ outcomes that it may produce. The term 113 
‘bricolage’ was originally used by the French anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1966) to describe 114 
how the ‘savage’ mind understands different cultures, and later developed by Douglas (1986) in 115 
the context of institutions, who argued that to economise on cognitive effort, actors borrow 116 
existing familiar institutions as a ‘frame of reference’ to understand new and ‘unfamiliar’ social 117 
phenomena. In the study of the commons, the use of the term institutional bricolage refers to “a 118 
process through which people, consciously and non-consciously, assemble or reshape 119 
institutional arrangements, drawing on whatever materials and resources are available, 120 
regardless of their original purpose” (De Koning and Cleaver, 2012, p. 4). 121 
This notion of institutional bricolage enables us to better understand human agency and the 122 
dynamic power relations involved in the institutional processes that arise in the governance of 123 
the commons. At this point, we make two remarks: first, the actors involved in institutional 124 
change are not powerless victims of this process, rather they are active ‘improvisers’. Drawing 125 
on Sewell (1992), we use the term human agency3 to refer to actors’ capacity to transpose and 126 
extend an ‘institutional logic’ to a new institutional context, where ‘institutional logic’ is the 127 
shared taken-for-granted social prescriptions that guide individual behaviour in an institutional 128 
context (Battilana, 2006). The institutional logic thus embodies belief systems and material 129 
practices that represent particular worldviews, valued ends, and the appropriate means to 130 
achieve such ends (Christiansen, Larke and Lounsbury, 2013). When actors are faced with new 131 
situations, they exercise their agency by extending their existing institutional logic and make do 132 
with whatever is at hand to fit the new institutional context (Baker and Nelson, 2005). 133 
                                                     
3 Agency is temporally embedded in the past and is oriented towards the future (Emirbayer and Mische, 
1998). On the one hand, because actors are born into a specific social structure, they internalise an 
institutional logic and follow routines forming habits or habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). On the other hand, 
actors face unexpected outcomes even when they follow habitus. Then they start to question what they 
have ‘taken for granted’. In such a circumstance, actors distance themselves from so-called common 
knowledge (Ishihara and Pascual, 2009), creating a space for them to reflect on their actions in relation to 
their circumstances. 
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The notion of ‘institutional logic’ in this paper is used in a similar sense to that of ‘habitus’ 134 
(Bourdieu, 1990) or ‘common knowledge’ 4  (Ishihara and Pascual, 2009). According to 135 
Bourdieu, habitus is similar to a ‘sense of the game’. A player in a game, in our terms an 136 
institutional bricoleur, is guided by a ‘sense of the game’; but at the same time, the player is not 137 
ruled by it. The player still has room to create new strategies and new moves. This is because 138 
actors are not merely embedded in one institutional logic but rather in ‘multiple habitus’ (Seo 139 
and Creed, 2002). For instance, an actor, such as a farmer, is not just a ‘farmer’, but is also 140 
engaged with different institutions and social groups such as neighbourhood associations and 141 
families, which yield different logics to justify various types of farming actions (Agrawal and 142 
Gibson, 1999; Cleaver, 2002; Leach et al., 1999).  143 
At the same time, some actors have the capacity to impose their institutional logic as the 144 
legitimate worldview and by so doing become the dominant group (Bourdieu, 1989). In this 145 
case a given institutional logic assumes a dominant role (Battilana, 2006; Reay and Hinings, 146 
2005). This leads us to our second remark: power relations are necessarily involved in any 147 
institutional change. When actors are faced with a new institutional context, they can generally 148 
contest which institutional logic is to be adopted. In other words, the institutional process 149 
involves ‘battlefields of legitimacy’5 where both dominant and marginalised actors challenge as 150 
to whose institutional logic is to be applied in guiding the process of institutional change. To 151 
this end, the use of the term power6 in this paper refers to the power to ‘naturalise’ institutional 152 
logics (Haugaard, 2008) so that an institution can present itself as if it is a part of the 153 
institutional logic as “the way we do things around here” (Foucault, 1977). 154 
Of course, some actors may resist the dominant or naturalised institutional logic. However, the 155 
possibility of resistance in the context of institutional change should not be romanticized (Van 156 
Hecken et al., 2015). We do not deny the possibility of marginalised actors challenging the 157 
naturalised institutional logic when institutions are going through transformation. The dominant 158 
actors will try to maintain their power by ensuring predictability but marginalised actors also 159 
                                                     
4  Other authors refer to this aspect of institutions as ‘institutional context’ (Clegg, 2010). We 
acknowledge that we are not using the term logic in a strict philosophical sense. However, we chose not 
to use the term ‘context’ in order to avoid confusion with the social and cultural context in which the 
actors are embedded which includes wider connotations beyond institutional logic. 
5 This notion is a modification of ‘battlefields of knowledge’ (Long and Long, 1992) in which different 
actors fight over meaning and moral affiliation in order to gain dominance in a field or domain. 
6 We concur with Haugaard (2008) that we should not look for a definitive definition of power; rather 
consider it as a ‘family resemblance’ concept in line with Wittgenstein (1968). 
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have an interest in adopting counterhegemonic practices to diminish the legitimacy of the 160 
dominant group and thus of the dominant institutional logic (Clegg, 2010). However, obviously 161 
not all marginalised actors have the capacity to challenge or resist. Depending on their social 162 
position within the community, actors have different levels of access to physical and so-called 163 
symbolic resources (Bourdieu, 1990). As a result, they do not all have the same capacity to 164 
produce effective claims towards naturalising their own institutional logic (Battilana, 2006). In 165 
fact, it is often the case that in contrast to more powerful actors, marginalised actors have to 166 
bear the burden of proof (Kohn, 2000). 167 
The emerging key message is that institutional bricolage, which focuses on agency embedded 168 
inside a set of power relations, enables us to better understand institutional change induced by 169 
new environmental governance approaches, such as through PES schemes (Büscher, 2012; 170 
Rodríguez-de-Francisco and Budds, 2015; Van Hecken et al., 2015). An institutional logic held 171 
by the ‘experts’ who introduce these approaches, i.e. policy makers and international NGOs, is 172 
not always shared with other key actors, e.g. local providers of ecosystem services. In such 173 
cases, the introduction of a PES approach to solve an environmental ‘externality’ provides the 174 
opportunity for local actors, both dominant and marginalised, to seek to exercise their agency in 175 
various ways. One way is for dominant actors to use this opportunity, e.g. by designing and 176 
implementing PES, to extend the legitimacy of their institutional logic and to reproduce their 177 
dominance over marginalised actors. But marginalised actors may also seize this opportunity to 178 
legitimise their own claims, such as access to certain ecosystem goods or services, demand for 179 
land tenure security, etc. which can challenge the power relations within their community 180 
(Hendrickson and Corbera, 2015; Shapiro-Garza, 2013). It is thus important to understand the 181 
institutional change induced by the introduction of PES schemes as a ‘messy’ process where 182 
bricoleurs continuously fight over the legitimacy of their own institutional logics. In this way, 183 
new power struggles arising from the introduction of PES schemes can be interpreted as key 184 
social inputs to be considered in their design and implementation (Muradian et al., 2013; 185 
Pascual et al., 2014; Van Hecken et al., 2015). 186 
It also follows that institutional change is not merely a process guided by rational calculation in 187 
order to achieve an optimal solution over an externality problem. Of course, within this 188 
mainstream approach, ‘second generation game theorists’ incorporate bounded rationality and 189 
other types of rationalities, such as interpersonal altruism, fairness, reciprocity and inequity 190 
aversion, into a rational choice model (Narloch et al., 2012; Ostrom and Ahn, 2009). However, 191 
the problem with this kind of modelling lies in its strict adherence to methodological 192 
individualism (Peacock, 2011). Altruistic individuals may choose to act altruistically because 193 
their welfare depends on them taking an altruistic action. Here “the tight link between individual 194 
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welfare and choice of action” (Sen, 1982, p. 8) is not broken. As a result, the mainstream 195 
approach cannot fully explain other types of institutional logic such as individuals acting as part 196 
of a ‘community’ with which they share a common ‘identity’ (Martins, 2009). 197 
3. Case study and methodology 198 
3.1. Case study background 199 
Many CPRs in Japan face the problem of under-use, often termed as the ‘Satoyama’ problem 200 
(Shimada, 2015). Historically, rural communities in Japan were heavily dependent on CPRs, 201 
such as communal forests, shallow seas, paddy fields and irrigation channels and thus developed 202 
strict institutions to avoid their over-use. These institutions are well-known for the graduated 203 
sanctions (McKean, 1992) linked to various social customs and norms that lead rule breakers to 204 
face social ostracism (Aoki, 2001).7 This suppressed the over-use of CPRs. However, following 205 
rural depopulation and economic transformation in Japan, especially since the 1960s (Hasumi, 206 
1990; Torigoe, 2007), the concern regarding CPRs has shifted from over-use to under-use, 207 
bringing different environmental challenges (Shimada, 2015). For example, the under-use of 208 
communal forests in Japan (called Iriai) causes a loss of biodiversity (Murota and Mitsumata 209 
2004) and ‘co-produced’ ecosystem services (Palomo et al., 2016), such as regulating services 210 
associated with water purification and prevention of land-slides (Morimoto, 2014). Additionally, 211 
and in conjunction with the under-use problem, important traditional communal organisations 212 
and institutions, once prevalent in hamlets and villages, are being eroded (Onda, 2006). Often, 213 
these communities feel themselves heavily burdened with the responsibilities of having to 214 
continue to manage the CPRs in traditional ways (Mitsumata et al., 2008). This has led many 215 
communities to hand over their CPR management to national or local governments to avoid the 216 
burden involved (Mitsumata and Inoue, 2010; Murota and Mitsumata, 2004). Other 217 
communities have chosen to co-manage their CPRs by involving new actors from outside the 218 
local community. For instance, schemes such as the ‘forest volunteer’ system, where volunteers 219 
are recruited from urban areas to conduct forest management together with forest owners 220 
(Yamamoto, 2003), or the terraced paddy field owner system, where urban residents invest 221 
financially and/or provide a workforce for the conservation of traditional terraced paddy fields 222 
(Maeda and Takao, 2007; Nakajima, 2007).  223 
                                                     
7 This custom was called ‘Mura-Hachibu’. This custom ostracises the households that violate the CPR 
institution from various social groups and social event organised by these groups. As Aoki (2001) argues 
this ostracism had a detrimental effect on the livelihoods of the villagers, the violation of CPR institutions 
was limited. 
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In this evolving social-ecological context, Toyoka City is considered by many as a success story 224 
for CPR management through the introduction of its PES scheme (Wittmer and Gundimeda, 225 
2010). The uniqueness of this PES lies in the fact that it has been implemented as part of a 226 
policy to conserve the Oriental White Stork, a flagship species. This species, which had become 227 
extinct in Japan by the 1980s, was reintroduced in Toyoka City which offered the last available 228 
habitat in Japan (Toyoka Municipal Government, 2007a). Oriental White Storks used to live in 229 
paddy fields and the surrounding irrigation channels. But the introduction of chemical pesticides 230 
and modernization of agricultural infrastructure during the 1950s drastically changed the natural 231 
environment, making it less suitable as a stork habitat and adding pressure to other direct drivers 232 
such as excessive hunting during the 1920s and 1930s and a decrease in genetic diversity due to 233 
the shrinking population. After the reintroduction of the species, various policies were tested to 234 
improve the quality of the habitat, mainly targeted at enhancing biodiversity in the paddy fields 235 
and surrounding wetlands. 236 
Two types of PES have been implemented in Toyoka; an eco-certification scheme and a 237 
co-management scheme. The former, called “the Dance of the Storks” (kounotori no mai), 238 
incentivized farmers to switch from conventional to organic farming by providing a premium 239 
price and some additional subsidies (Honda, 2008b; Kikuchi, 2006; Toyoka Municipal 240 
Government, 2007b). Further, this scheme allows consumers to pay a price premium not just for 241 
organic products but also for providing Stork habitat. The co-management scheme is still at a 242 
nascent stage and to date has only been implemented in Tai Hamlet, which is our case study site 243 
(NGO Wetlands Action Circle for Oriental White Storks, 2012). The hamlet receives limited 244 
funds from the local government and an NGO in order to conduct activities for stork 245 
conservation (for details see section 4.1.). 246 
This paper focuses on the co-management scheme introduced in Tai Hamlet as a pilot project by 247 
the local Toyoka government and a local NGO. The hamlet is located in the northern part of 248 
Toyoka City (see map in Figure 1). In 2013, it consisted of around 50 households with a 249 
population of around 200. The hamlet suffers from an ageing and declining population: one 250 
third of the population is over 65 years old, well above the national average of 23% (Cabinet 251 
Office, 2012). Average annual per capita income is about JPY 3.5 million or ca. USD 43,750,8 252 
above the national average of JPY 2.9 million or ca. USD 35,750. Before the 1960s, the 253 
residents of this hamlet were heavily dependent on CPRs for their livelihoods, especially the 254 
rice paddies and shallow sea fishery. However, residents can no longer sustain their traditional 255 
                                                     
8 Using the conversion rate of USD1= JPY80 (average rate for 2013). 
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livelihoods based on agriculture and fishing, and during the 1960s, the hamlet witnessed 256 
significant out-migration of young people to urban areas such as Osaka and Tokyo (Minato 257 
Community Centre, 1965). This led to the disbandment of various communal organisations, 258 
such as the young men’s and women’s associations. Further, during the 1960s, the remaining 259 
residents started to work outside of the hamlet, including in the adjacent Kinosaki area or the 260 
city centre of Toyoka. This diversified not only the income sources of the residents but also 261 
their interest in CPR institutions and rice cultivation activities.9 In other words, this hamlet has 262 
gone through a gradual ‘delocalization’ process, through which it has become more intimately 263 
connected to actors outside the local domain (Ojha et al. 2016). In this social context, the hamlet, 264 
or at least its leaders, decided to accept the co-management scheme in 2009 by modifying the 265 
existing local institution for the management of its CPRs, particularly the terraced paddy fields. 266 
 267 
Figure 1. Location of field study of Tai Hamlet in Toyoka City (Hyogo Prefecture, Japan) 268 
 269 
                                                     
9 Due to this diverse interest, Tai Hamlet failed to implement farmland consolidation despite three 
attempts since the 1960s. To implement the consolidation project, all the paddy field owners in the hamlet 
had to agree to share the cost of the project. However, the hamlet failed to reach agreement due to the 
different interests among the land owners. 
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3.2. Fieldwork methods 270 
Fieldwork was carried out in Tai Hamlet between January and December of 2010 and further 271 
short-term field visits were undertaken between 2011 and 2013 to follow up on specific issues. 272 
Methods included i) in-depth interviews with different key actors, ii) participant observation of 273 
various communal events in the hamlet, and iii) observation of meetings between the hamlet 274 
leaders and other stakeholders such as government officials and NGOs and meetings among the 275 
residents and the leadership council. The KJ method (Kawakita, 1970, 1967) (discussed below) 276 
was used for qualitative analysis of the data collected through these three complementary 277 
approaches. Discourse analysis was undertaken of government policy documents related to 278 
stork conservation and use was made of a municipal database on agricultural statistics. 279 
Two types of interviews were undertaken in Japanese. Firstly, a series of non-structured 280 
interviews was conducted with residents of the hamlet, especially residents from older 281 
generations and members of the leadership council, 10  regarding the changes in CPR 282 
management, their livelihoods, and past as well as current life in the hamlet. The sampling for 283 
unstructured interviews used a snowball method. Through these in-depth interviews, we gained 284 
basic information on the institutional and organisational structure of the hamlet.  285 
Subsequently, strategically targeted interviews were conducted with individuals and groups in 286 
relation to each of the various organisations in the community such as the leadership council, 287 
neighbourhood groups and fire-fighting group (see a list of communal groups in Appendix 1 288 
and an organigram of the hamlet in Appendix 2). At least two group interviews were completed 289 
with members of each of the organisations. Initial interviews gathered general information about 290 
the organisations as well as information about interactions amongst the residents involved in 291 
them. Follow-up interviews were conducted to ask in-depth questions, especially regarding i) 292 
the roles that each organisation performs in various communal events and ii) the residents’ 293 
motivation for participating in these communal events. Since these organisations are organised 294 
by gender and age, these group interviews were utilised to collect life histories from each 295 
generation and gender. Most of the interviews were carried out through personal visits, i.e. 296 
                                                     
10 The leadership council is composed of nine members who are elected at the annual meeting by all the 
households in the hamlet. Once they are elected, they will serve as a ‘leader’ (yakuin) until they decide to 
retire. The position of ‘hamlet chief’ (kucho) is rotated among these nine members and it is this council 
which makes the decision regarding the hamlet and negotiates with outside parties, such as NGOs and the 
Toyoka local government. 
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going either to individuals’ houses or to the location of the activity, since most of the groups 297 
held meetings at least once a month.  298 
Participant observation was conducted during various communal events associated with 299 
introduction of a ‘Storks labour day’, e.g. negotiation between the municipal government and 300 
the hamlet, as well as with traditional ‘labour days’, communal festivals, funerals, religious 301 
events and annual meetings. This participant observation approach provided an important 302 
opportunity to closely observe some of the conflicts inside the community and between the 303 
community and other actors. In order to provide additional contextual information, meetings 304 
held between the hamlet and the government convened to decide various issues relating to 305 
conservation policy were also observed. 306 
The KJ method, developed by Jiro Kawakita, was used to systematically summarise qualitative 307 
data (Kawakita, 1970, 1967). The method takes three steps. First, cards are generated by 308 
transcribing information from the interviews. One statement is transcribed on each card. Next, 309 
cards with similar statements are clustered together. Finally, the clusters are schematised to 310 
illustrate the relationships between clusters. This method makes it possible to analyse the vast 311 
amount of data collected through different fieldwork methods, such as interviews and 312 
participant observation, without losing its meaning; however, a weakness lies in that its 313 
clustering can be rather arbitrary (Sato, 2008). The method was chosen because it affords the 314 
most freedom in coding, which was necessary in order to understand the complexity of the CPR 315 
institutions, especially the arrangements for the collective management of paddy fields and 316 
other communal resources in Tai Hamlet. The statements quoted in the following sections have 317 
been carefully chosen to represent the clusters of statements created through the KJ method. 318 
They illustrate the views shared among the residents in the hamlet rather than the authors 319 
attempting to rephrase them in their own words. 320 
 321 
4. ‘Fitting’ the new PES scheme to the local institutional logic in Tai Hamlet 322 
4.1. Introduction of the co-management scheme through the Storks labour day 323 
A co-management scheme, based around a ‘Storks labour day’, was introduced in Tai Hamlet in 324 
2009. The ‘labour day’ (Hiyaku), is an institution for managing terraced paddy fields. 325 
Cultivating paddy rice requires collective action because it utilises a gravity-fed irrigation 326 
system (Onda, 2006). Under the Hiyaku institution, each household has to provide the labour of 327 
one person, ideally the head of the household or another adult male, on certain days during the 328 
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year. While there is no formal penalty for non-attendance on labour day, attendance is checked 329 
by calling out the name of each household in front of everyone, thus creating peer-pressure that 330 
functions as an informal sanctioning mechanism. Further, if there is any absentee, the leaders 331 
will go to their house to collect the missing person. 332 
The Hiyaku institution is deeply embedded in the social context of the hamlet. Although, the 333 
main purpose of the labour day was to maintain various types of infrastructure for rice 334 
production, such as irrigation channels and paths to the paddy fields, it also has religious 335 
significance. Hiyaku is considered as a day to recreate a spiritual pathway for ancestors so that 336 
they may come back to the village during the summer period. Further, the hamlet has a custom 337 
called ‘selling-off’ (Haraimon) which is also associated with Hiyaku. Historically, residents 338 
planning to migrate out of the hamlet were obliged to sell their properties, including their house, 339 
lands and terraced paddy fields because they could no longer participate in Hiyaku and fulfil 340 
their collective action duties. It is thus important to note that Hiyaku as a collective action 341 
institution goes beyond the management of CPRs within the hamlet; it also establishes the ‘civic’ 342 
duties of the community and cements the identity of its members.  343 
However, the Hiyaku, as a deeply embedded CPR institution, has faced serious challenges as 344 
Tai Hamlet has gradually withdrawn from rice cultivation, which stopped completely in 2006. 345 
Rice production was ended for various reasons, including the effects of the Japanese 346 
Government’s agricultural policy introduced to prevent excessive supply of rice, a rapidly 347 
ageing and declining population, and damage caused by wild animals, such as boar and deer. It 348 
was in this context, that a pair of Oriental White Storks arrived in the hamlet in 2007 and, along 349 
with other individual birds, began feeding on the abandoned terraced paddy fields. Because this 350 
species feeds on the managed paddy fields and surrounding wetlands, in 2008, a local NGO, the 351 
Wetlands Action Circle for Oriental White Storks (WACOWS)11 along with the Toyoka 352 
municipal government,12 approached the hamlet with the intention of resuming management of 353 
terraced paddy fields using volunteers from outside the hamlet. 354 
                                                     
11 WACOW was founded by a former Toyoka government staff member who was head of the department 
in charge of Oriental White Stork conservation. He is also a close friend of the current mayor who is the 
prime driver for promoting Oriental White Stork conservation in Toyoka. 
12 Both WACOW and the local government are considered as outsiders by the residents of Tai Hamlet. 
From their perspective, the interests of the NGO and the local government do not coincide with those of 
the hamlet. For the NGO and the local government, the goal is to conserve Oriental White Storks, 
whereas for the hamlet, the conservation of Oriental White Storks is a means to an end, to revive their 
community and to bring back the younger generation. 
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In 2009, the Tai Hamlet leadership council13 officially accepted the invitation to become the 355 
pilot site for a co-management scheme for terraced paddy fields for Oriental White Storks and 356 
the hamlet agreed to add a new version of Hiyaku, in addition to the continuing traditional 357 
labour days, known as Kounotori Biyaku, the Storks labour day. This new ‘labour day’ differs 358 
from the traditional days in two ways. Firstly, the new Hiyaku aims to create a habitat for 359 
Oriental White Storks, rather than to maintain infrastructure for rice cultivation. Secondly, 360 
Hiyaku involves both residents and actors from outside the hamlet, i.e. local NGO and Toyoka 361 
local government employees and volunteers from Osaka and Kyoto.  362 
The Toyoka local government introduced monetary as well as in-kind payments to compensate 363 
for the cost of conservation work for Oriental White Storks, mainly the work on the Storks 364 
labour day, and to incentivise community members to participate in the conservation activities. 365 
The local government and the NGO also suggested a Storks eco-tourism project in order to raise 366 
further income through the conservation of the Storks. The local government and the NGO 367 
mobilised funds and brought external experts to help create habitat for Oriental White Storks. 368 
When implementing activities inside the hamlet, they always asked for the participation of the 369 
leadership council. 370 
From the commencement of this co-management scheme, the stakeholders were motivated by 371 
different interests. The local government and WACOW were motivated by the conservation of 372 
Oriental White Storks and their habitat, whereas the hamlet residents, especially the leaders, 373 
were more concerned with sustaining their Hiyaku institution and their community as a whole. 374 
As mentioned previously, the Hiyaku institution was suffering from the declining population 375 
and the end of rice cultivation. Their desire to continue growing rice and to maintain Hiyaku is 376 
apparent in the fact that the residents, not just the leaders, often refused to refer to the terraced 377 
paddy field as “abandoned paddy fields kousaku-hokichi”, and instead called them “fallow-land 378 
kyukonchi”, despite the fact that they all knew that they would not resume rice cultivation in the 379 
near future. This discrepancy in the motivation caused a fierce controversy between the 380 
‘outsiders’, i.e. the local government and WACOW, and the ‘insiders’, i.e. the residents, when 381 
the ‘outsiders’ tried to prioritise stork conservation goals over the needs of the community as 382 
described in the following section. 383 
                                                     
13 The leadership council conducted all the official negotiations with the Toyoka local government and 
NGO and took all decisions related to the hamlet. 
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In the following section, based on fieldwork data, we first describe the way external payments 384 
were distributed within the community, revealing the influence of the community leaders’ local 385 
institutional logic on the payment scheme’s distributional design. We then discuss the conflict 386 
arising due to the rejection of the eco-tourism proposal as part of the PES scheme, by local 387 
community leaders who adhered to their own/dominant institutional logic. Finally, we argue 388 
that, most significantly, community leaders took the opportunity presented by the introduction 389 
of the PES to exercise their power to reinforce their dominant institutional logic in the face of 390 
resistance from marginalised groups. 391 
 392 
4.2. PES design and its need to ‘fit’ the dominant local institutional logic 393 
The hamlet’s involvement in Oriental White Stork conservation, especially through the 394 
establishment of the Storks Hiyaku, has brought some financial benefits through: i) a direct 395 
financial contribution to the hamlet budget from WACOWS for the collective work that the 396 
hamlet undertakes on labour days (e.g. JPY 528,000 ca. USD 6600 in 2012), ii) fees paid by 397 
visitors to the hamlet (JPY 500 per visitor amounting to about JPY 130,000 ca. USD 1625 in 398 
2012), iii) payments by visitors to use communal facilities such as the community centre when 399 
WACOWS or the local municipal government conducts various activities locally.14 Together 400 
the annual income received by the hamlet is ca. USD 8,750, equivalent to about 25% of the 401 
annual hamlet budget.  402 
The funds accruing to the hamlet are distributed through the existing ‘hamlet tax’ (Ku-hi), a 403 
monthly payment collected from each household to contribute to the hamlet budget. In 2010, the 404 
monthly payment ranged from JPY 2,800 to 5,400 (about USD 35-67.5) per month, depending 405 
on the income level and financial conditions of each household. The funds received from the 406 
conservation were used to waive the hamlet tax for August as compensation for participating in 407 
the Hiyaku in July. That is, each household received JPY 2,800-5,400. This distribution 408 
mechanism fits the leaders’ institutional logic that the communal benefits in connection to the 409 
communal property must be distributed to the whole community in an egalitarian way. In order 410 
to reveal this institutional logic, we look into the conflict that this raised between the hamlet 411 
leaders and the local government and WACOW. 412 
                                                     
14 According to the hamlet’s financial report distributed at the annual meeting on 20th December 2012 
and some interviews with members of the leadership council. 
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In the Autumn of 2010, the local government and WACOW suggested to the leadership council 413 
that the payment, not entirely but partially, should be distributed to individuals. They wanted to 414 
incentivise individuals, especially women and young people. Women were the ones mainly 415 
involved in implementing various conservation activities other than through the Storks Hiyaku, 416 
such as conducting excursions for local schools and tours for visitors. Further, the local 417 
government and WACOW were concerned about the sustainability of the co-management 418 
scheme itself. The younger generation was deemed to be vital for the survival of this PES 419 
scheme over the longer term. However, because the payments were distributed to all the 420 
households equally, the women and young people considered them as a payment to the head of 421 
household. Some residents felt that they had undertaken the work of managing the paddy fields 422 
without receiving any payment or compensation because they were not the head of household. 423 
This was especially frustrating for those women who actively participated in activities related to 424 
the conservation of the storks. 425 
However, when the local government and the NGO suggested distributing the payments to 426 
individuals, one of the hamlet leaders refused stating that:  427 
“No way! There is no need to pay individuals. They are making money from the 428 
communal property. The money should go to the hamlet not to the individual” 429 
(Community leader during an interview after the meeting with local government and 430 
WACOW on 20th November 2010; own translation).15 431 
This statement reveals hamlet leaders’ institutional logic. For them, the terraced paddy fields are 432 
communal property and the benefit arising from it must be distributed to the households in an 433 
egalitarian way, not to the individuals based on their efforts towards the conservation of the 434 
habitat for the storks. Part of the institutional logic, i.e. treating the terraced paddy fields as 435 
communal property, is manifested by the fact that two households, which do not own any 436 
terraced paddy fields, have nevertheless participated in the Hiyaku institution because ‘they are 437 
part of the hamlet’.16 The previously mentioned custom, ‘selling-off’ (Haraimon), provides 438 
                                                     
15 Another leader commented that: 
“All the payment should go into the hamlet first. If it is to be distributed, it should be to the 
household not to the individuals, because the households are the ones providing labour for the 
Hiyaku and other communal duties. To be honest I do not understand why the young people 
are making a fuss about this. If it is distributed to the household, it is the same. No?” 
(Interview conducted with community leader on 8th December 2010; own translation). 
16 According to the interview conducted with these households which do not own any rice-fields on 11th 
August 2010. 
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further evidence of this institutional logic. A household that moves out of the hamlet cannot 439 
hold rights in the communal property because they are no longer part of the community.17 It 440 
should be noted though that the unit of reference for distributional purposes is the household, 441 
not the individual. This is also reflected in various institutions within the hamlet, such as the 442 
hamlet tax and the Hiyaku institution. It is the household which provides the labour for Hiyaku 443 
and pays the tax. 444 
The suggestion by the government and WACOW was especially problematic as it went against 445 
the institutional logics. The hamlet leaders felt that the local government and the NGO were 446 
prioritising stork conservation rather than their own community.18 In other words, the leaders 447 
chose to distribute the benefits from the co-management scheme through the hamlet tax system 448 
so that they could reinforce the legitimacy of their institutional logic. To this end, the leaders 449 
were not just powerless victims but rather actors who were able to utilise their institutional logic 450 
to rearrange the PES scheme to ‘fit’ the local social context, and by doing so subvert some of 451 
the original intention of the local government and the NGO that introduced the co-management 452 
PES scheme. The local government and the NGO had to pull back from their preference for the 453 
individual distributional rule, which might have challenged the legitimacy of the local 454 
leadership. In fact, policy makers were heavily dependent on the hamlet leadership council for 455 
implementing various activities in the hamlet.1920 This reaction by the leaders is not surprising 456 
when we consider the fact that they are faced with resistance from young people, who have 457 
different interests in the CPR in the context of the ‘delocalization’ of the hamlet. Before going 458 
into the issue of resistance to and challenges faced by the local leaders, the next section reveals 459 
how far the leaders were willing to go in reinforcing the legitimacy of their institutional logic. 460 
 461 
                                                     
17 This has been described as the ‘duality of land ownership’ by many Japanese rural sociologists. This 
refers to a notion strongly held in Japanese rural societies that all land, including the paddy fields, belongs 
to the hamlet or the village not just to the individual residents or households (Fujimura, 2001; Torigoe, 
1993). In these communities, private land ownership co-exists with communal land ownership (Kada, 
1997). 
18 According to a personal conversation with the hamlet chief on 20th November 2010. 
19 It is our understanding that a majority of the local government staff and the NGO leaders were also in a 
similar position to the hamlet leaders in their own hamlets. Thus, they were more sympathetic towards the 
leaders than towards the female or young residents. 
20 In the end, policy makers came up with a compromise to organize a study-tour to Lake Shinji as a form 
of in-kind payment. The tour was organised so that the participants would be able to enjoy sightseeing as 
compensation for the female residents (According to a personal conversation with local government staff 
on 15th August 2011). 
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4.3. Conflicts over the distributional design of PES under the dominant local 462 
institutional logic 463 
The economic impacts arising from Oriental White Stork conservation in Toyoka are estimated 464 
at USD 12.5 million, or JPY 1 billion per annum (Ohnuma and Yamamoto, 2009). To further 465 
expedite the co-management in Tai Hamlet, a proposal was made by the local government and 466 
WACOW to develop an eco-tourism project within the hamlet. This proposal to develop stork 467 
eco-tourism gained momentum when the local government negotiated with the hamlet over the 468 
inclusion of the terraced paddy fields within a wetland area being designated during the 11th 469 
Conference of the Parties to the Ramsar Convention in Bucharest (the Lower Maruyama River 470 
and surrounding paddy fields). The Ramsar Convention requires protection of wetlands through 471 
domestic law (Halls, 1997) which is implemented in Japan through the ‘wildlife reserve’ 472 
(choju-hogoku) scheme under the 2002 Wildlife Protection and Hunting Law (Tanaka, 2008). 473 
Once the area is designated as a ‘wildlife reserve’, any kind of development project or 474 
construction work would require permission from the prefectural government and no hunting 475 
would be allowed in the area. The stork eco-tourism project was proposed as compensation for 476 
restricting future development options in Tai Hamlet.  477 
However, the leaders’ response was ambivalent at best. They argued that the eco-tourism 478 
project would only benefit certain individuals, particularly two hostel owners. For the hamlet 479 
leaders, this was especially problematic since the hostel owners were themselves members of 480 
the leadership council. They feared that if they were seen by the rest of the hamlet to be 481 
profiting from the communal property and breaking the local institutional logic, their authority 482 
could be undermined and their institutional logic delegitimized. For example, one of the hostel 483 
owners explicitly said that he did not want to be seen by other residents as gaining personal 484 
benefit:  485 
It is not right to make personal profit from the communal property. What do you think 486 
others would think? We are already having a difficult time persuading villagers to join 487 
the labour days. If I do such a selfish thing, what do you think will happen? (Member 488 
of leadership council and hostel owner in his 60s from personal interview on 13th April 489 
2011; own translation). 490 
The hamlet leadership thus declined the eco-tourism development proposal as part of the 491 
broader PES scheme. For the leaders, the financial returns from eco-tourism were seen as 492 
illegitimate because they would be profiting personally from the ‘communal properties’. This 493 
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also goes against their institutional logic by which the return from the PES ought to be 494 
distributed in an egalitarian way within the community. The two hostel owners, as part of the 495 
hamlet leadership, were willing to voluntarily sacrifice an economic opportunity in order to 496 
adhere to the local institutional logic. This shows that the leaders are not just economically 497 
rational actors aiming at optimizing financial flows for the community from the terraced paddy 498 
fields but actors who hold multiple social identities and rationalities within a community context 499 
(Schnegg and Linke, 2015). They are capable of reinforcing the legitimacy of the dominant 500 
institutional logic. Next, we analyse why such an active re-imposition of the dominant 501 
institutional logic was necessary in Tai Hamlet in the context of ‘delocalization’. 502 
 503 
4.4. Adherence to the local institutional logic and reproduction of power relations 504 
As discussed previously, the majority of the hamlet’s residents have diversified their income 505 
outside the hamlet. This has weakened or more precisely diversified their interests over the 506 
maintenance of the traditional CPR and enabled them to challenge the legitimacy of the Hiyaku 507 
institution. This is especially the case since the cessation of rice cultivation in 2006. Some 508 
residents have openly voiced discontent during the annual community meetings when the 509 
schedules for Hiyaku were announced by asking questions such as:  510 
Why do we have to continue to maintain things that we do not use any more? We 511 
stopped cultivating rice. It is a waste of time and money. How stupid are we to continue 512 
carrying out Hiyaku? (Male resident in his 70s during the annual meeting on 3rd 513 
January 2010; own translation)21 514 
Others adopt a subtler resistance strategy by providing a substitute worker on the labour-day, 515 
often an elderly female instead of a male labourer. A few households take even further measures 516 
to avoid participating in Hiyaku and other communal obligations by obtaining residence cards 517 
                                                     
21 Other residents express their discontent towards the Hiyaku, one stated that: 
I understand hamlet’s tradition and the importance of hiyaku and other communal 
obligations. I want to continue these traditions. But look at the situation. That generation (the 
generation of the members of leadership council) had nearly 30 people, but ours only has 2. 
How can we maintain the same level of work? It is not realistic. It is causing the young 
generation to move away from the hamlet. (according to an interview with a female resident 
in her 40s, on 15th August 2010: own translation) 
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for their younger generation from different areas of Toyoka. This is because people who are not 518 
officially residents are not obliged to participate. 519 
The legitimacy of the Hiyaku and its institutional logic have been challenged in other ways too. 520 
To illustrate this, we note a fierce controversy that occurred in 2012 over the retirement fee paid 521 
to the male fire-fighting group, which functions as an extension of the public Fire Department. 522 
Although this controversy is not directly related to the broader PES scheme and the 523 
management of the CPR institution, it reveals the more general challenges and resistance that 524 
the hamlet leaders face. In the hamlet, those who serve in the fire-fighting group receive a 525 
retirement fee from the local Fire Department when they retire at the age of 42. This fee has 526 
been paid into the hamlet budget instead of being paid to the individuals involved. The young 527 
residents, who serve as members of the fire-fighting group, have argued that individuals have 528 
the ‘right’ to receive the retirement fee individually since they are the ones who served as 529 
fire-fighters. They also referred to the fact that in other neighbouring hamlets, the payments are 530 
made individually. In response, the leaders fiercely accused the young residents of being 531 
‘selfish’, as from their institutional logic, the retirement fee was paid for a communal activity 532 
and thus should not be paid to individuals. They argued that it was the hamlet that runs the 533 
fire-fighting group, not the particular individuals who serve in it. 534 
Although the young residents did not succeed with their claims, this controversy within the 535 
hamlet reveals that they are gaining power to negotiate vis-a-vis their leaders in the hamlet. The 536 
younger residents do not adhere to the same institutional logic as the leaders and have shown 537 
they are capable of challenging it publicly. This is mainly because the younger generations are 538 
not ‘educated’ in the communal customs and the institutional logic that runs through them. Due 539 
to the rapid fall in population, many communal groups have disappeared or become dormant 540 
over the past 50 years, such as the youth association and agricultural association. In the past, as 541 
the young male residents grew older, they ‘graduated’ from one group to the next, learning ‘the 542 
right way of doing things’. However due to the disappearance of these groups and the 543 
engagement with the world outside of the hamlet, the younger generation is now exposed to 544 
different types of institutional logic, including those that emphasize individualistic norms.22 It 545 
                                                     
22 But at the same time, the disappearance of communal groups has negatively impacted the younger 
generations. Their claim was easily silenced by the leaders as ‘ignorant’ due to their lack of ‘education’ in 
communal customs and the institutional logic. Further, the younger generations are not represented in the 
leadership council. Previously when the hamlet was cultivating rice, all the young residents joined the 
agricultural association. If they could prove themselves in this association, they would then be given an 
opportunity to join the leadership council. However, since this association is now dormant, young people 
cannot prove themselves, resulting in a stagnation in the membership of the leadership council. In fact, 
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is in this context that the leaders chose to sacrifice their individual gains by forgoing the 546 
opportunity presented by the stork eco-tourism project. By showing their adherence to their 547 
institutional logic, the leaders are demonstrating that their institutional logic is the ‘right way of 548 
doing things’ in Tai Hamlet in the face of the resistance from the younger generation. 549 
This controversy shows that the legitimacy of the dominant institutional logic, that the benefits 550 
arising from communal activities should be distributed in an egalitarian manner, has been 551 
seriously challenged. The introduction of the PES scheme presented an opportunity for the 552 
dominant group, the hamlet leaders, to re-assert their institutional logic as the legitimate view of 553 
the world vis-a-vis the marginalised group, the younger generation. In order to do so, the 554 
dominant group had to negotiate the distribution mechanism and to forego the eco-tourism 555 
project. The case of Tai Hamlet illustrates that although the introduction of the PES scheme 556 
contributed to the reproduction of power relations within the hamlet, the dominant actors did not 557 
have a free hand in doing so. Rather it is a ‘battlefield of legitimacy’ where the dominant and 558 
marginalised actors fight over whose logic should be applied to a new institutional context, i.e. 559 
the new PES scheme.  560 
 561 
5. Conclusions 562 
This paper has applied the idea of institutional bricolage to analyse a situation where PES 563 
schemes are introduced, creating a ‘messy’ institutional transformation process in the context of 564 
the management of CPRs. By means of a case study of a hamlet community in Japan, in the 565 
context of the conservation of the Oriental White Stork, we have shown that the leaders of the 566 
hamlet actively incorporated a PES scheme as a new conservation institution, in light of their 567 
own local institutional logic. The case study shows that the community leaders used the 568 
introduction of the PES scheme as an opportunity to reinforce the eroding legitimacy of the 569 
traditional CPR institution and their dominant institutional logic i.e. that the benefits from the 570 
management of the CPR should be shared in an egalitarian way among the households of the 571 
community instead of being targeted to individuals. At the same time, we revealed that the 572 
leaders are faced with severe resistance from marginalised actors, especially from the younger 573 
residents. It is in the context of this resistance that the leaders re-asserted their institutional logic 574 
as the legitimate worldview. This case study illustrates how the notion of institutional bricolage 575 
                                                                                                                                                           
the current leadership council has not had a new member for more than 10 years and the youngest 
member is already in his 50s. 
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can help to unravel the agency and power relations involved in the introduction of a collective 576 
PES instrument. 577 
This connects with Norgaard’s (2010) notion of ‘complexity blinder’. He argued that the PES 578 
discourse blinds us to the complexity of ecosystems and ecosystem service co-production. Here 579 
we go further by uncovering another layer of social-ecological complexity, i.e. the complexity 580 
of power relations. We argue that the introduction of a PES scheme as a new institution in any 581 
social context induces a ‘battlefield of legitimacy’ as to who has the right to dictate the new 582 
institutional process. Actors produce their own interpretations of the logic of PES and utilise 583 
those interpretations to extend their interests and goals, leading to a ‘messy’ institutional 584 
process. In this way, dominant actors, in our case study the leaders of Tai Hamlet in Toyoka 585 
City, have managed to impose their interpretation of a fair distribution of the payments onto 586 
non-dominant actors, such as the younger residents, closing down alternative interpretations of 587 
what is just or fair, providing institutional stability, and (re)producing power relations in the 588 
community. The study demonstrates that the institutional change induced by a PES is loaded 589 
with subtle political struggles between the dominant and marginalised groups and their 590 
associated interests. 591 
So then, how can the application of this idea of institutional bricolage help to better capture the 592 
implications of PES interventions? First, it calls for the analysis of agency and power relations 593 
arising from the implementation of PES schemes. This is especially important considering the 594 
popularity of such schemes that embody trade-offs between conservation goals and complex 595 
social equity considerations (Milne and Adams, 2012; Pascual et al., 2010). The implementation 596 
of PES schemes requires an assessment of agency and power relations in local social-cultural 597 
contexts, especially with regard to the perspectives, or institutional logics of marginalised actors 598 
(Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2016; Shapiro-Garza, 2013). Second, the notion of institutional 599 
bricolage contributes to the re-politicisation of the PES discourse which has often been obscured 600 
by neoliberal terminology (Milne and Adams, 2012). In this regard, a key challenge lies in 601 
effectively communicating to policy makers the social complexity surrounding the need for the 602 
re-politicisation of PES schemes and to get beyond purely technical debates about their design 603 
and implementation. This calls for research to engage in the co-production of knowledge with 604 
stakeholders to improve the understanding and thus the co-design of PES schemes in order to 605 
take account of ‘messy’ institutional processes.  606 
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Appendix 1. List of communal groups in Tai Hamlet and number of interviews and 607 
participant observations conducted in these groups 608 
Communal group Number of interviews Participant observation 
Leadership council 
21 (12 group interviews and 9 
individual interviews) 
Annual meetings 
Negotiations with the local 
government 
Neighbourhood group 
9 (2 group interviews for the 
group in the neighbourhood 
where the lead author resided, 
and 7 interviews for each 
neighbourhood group chief) 
Seasonal religious events/ 
cleaning events 
Agricultural association 
5 (2 individual interviews with 
the representative of the 
Agricultural association and 3 
with individual farmers who 
cultivated rice until 2006) 
N.A. 
Fishery association 
5 (2 group interviews with the 
members, 2 individual 
interviews with the 
representative of the Fishery 
association, 1 individual 
interview with the holder of 
fishing rights)  
Seaweed collection conducted 
during March and April/ Seaweed 
festival organised by the 
community 
Fire-fighting group 
5 (2 group interviews, 3 
individual interviews) 
Monthly training for the 
fire-fighting group 
Female fire-fighting group 
6 (2 group interviews, 4 
individual interviews) 
Monthly training for the 
fire-fighting group 
Night watch N.A. Rotational night-watch activities 
Elderly club 2 (2 group interviews)  
Religious group 2 (2 group interviews) 
Religious events, such as ‘Bon’ 
during August  
Funeral group  2 (2 group interviews) Funeral in August 2010 
 609 
  610 
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Appendix 2. Organigram of Tai Hamlet 611 
 612 
 613 
 614 
  615 
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